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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 These consolidated cases stem from a single lawsuit  
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by two married couples and their affiliated entities.  They 
sued the Virgin Islands and its tax agency seeking a 
determination of the source of certain income, and the United 
States seeking tax refunds.  The United States District Court 
of the Virgin Islands (the “V. I. District Court” or simply the 
“District Court”) dismissed their claim against the Virgin 
Islands and transferred their claims against the United States 
to the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida.  The plaintiffs have directly appealed the District 
Court‟s dismissal of their claim against the Virgin Islands, 
and they have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 
concerning their claims against the United States.
1
  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the holding of the District 
Court and deny the mandamus petition. 
I. Background and Procedural History 
 Harvey and Diane Birdman formed a Virgin Islands 
corporation, Barclay Associates, Inc. (“Barclay”).  Herbert 
and Bonita Hirsch also formed a Virgin Islands corporation, 
Kingsbridge Associates, Inc. (“Kingsbridge”).  During the 
relevant time period, tax year 2006, Barclay and Kingsbridge 
were among the limited partners in a Virgin Islands limited 
liability limited partnership, Four Points Management LLLP 
(“Four Points”).  Barclay and Kingsbridge derived all of their 
income from their stakes in Four Points. 
 The Birdmans and the Hirsches assert that they were 
not “bona fide residents” of the Virgin Islands in 2006.  See 
I.R.C. § 937(a).  However, they claim that a portion of their 
income was “derived from sources within the Virgin Islands.”  
See id. § 932(a)(1)(A)(ii).  Specifically, Harvey Birdman‟s 
                                              
1
 Though in the first instance they are appellants and the 
second petitioners, for convenience we define them below as 
“Appellants.” 
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2006 tax return indicates that 85.7% of his income was 
derived from the Virgin Islands; for Herbert Hirsch, it was 
81.47%.  The men, who filed jointly with their wives, claimed 
that all of their Virgin Islands income came from Barclay and 
Kingsbridge, respectively. 
 Taxpayers situated like the Birdmans and the 
Hirsches—that is, taxpayers who are not “bona fide residents” 
but claim to have derived some income from the Virgin 
Islands—must file two tax returns.  Id. § 932(a)(2).  Their 
Virgin Islands tax return should include taxes payable on all 
income “derived from sources within the Virgin Islands.”  Id. 
§ 932(b)(1), (b)(2)(B).  Their United States tax return should 
include taxes payable on the remaining income.  Id. 
§ 932(a)(3), (b)(3). 
 Both couples in our case filed the proper 2006 tax 
returns, one with the United States and one with the Virgin 
Islands.  But they each made only one payment.  Rather than 
paying the Virgin Islands its share, as § 932 requires, both 
couples paid both their United States taxes and their Virgin 
Islands taxes to the United States.  The taxpayers allege that 
they did so “with the good faith belief that the [United States] 
IRS would pay the amount[s] due to the [Virgin Islands] to 
the [Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue (“VIBIR”)], 
or, alternatively, that the VIBIR would obtain the amounts 
from the IRS.”  Compl. ¶¶ 49, 52.  The United States, though, 
has neither paid those sums to the Virgin Islands nor refunded 
them to the taxpayers.  Nor has the Virgin Islands sought to 
claim those sums from the United States.  Caught between 
Scylla and Charybdis, the Birdmans and the Hirsches 
complain that they owe debts to the Virgin Islands that equal 
their overpayments to the United States. 
 The Birdmans, the Hirsches, Barclay, and Kingsbridge 
(collectively, the “Appellants”) brought this suit in 2009 in 
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the District Court.  They named both the Virgin Islands 
(including its agency, the VIBIR) and the United States as 
defendants but sought different relief from each.  Against the 
Virgin Islands, they requested a “negative injunction” that 
would compel the VIBIR to declare whether the income in 
question was “derived from sources within the Virgin 
Islands.”2  (They claim that the income was so derived, but 
the United States IRS has challenged that claim in other 
proceedings.)  Against the United States, they requested 
refunds of the amounts they contend they initially should 
have paid to the Virgin Islands. 
 The Virgin Islands moved to dismiss Appellants‟ claim 
against it pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The District Court granted 
its motion to dismiss, holding that Appellants had failed to 
state a claim against the Virgin Islands.  In the alternative, the 
Court held that Appellants‟ claim against the Virgin Islands 
was not ripe for decision.  This dismissal is before us on 
direct appeal as case 10-4189. 
 The United States moved to dismiss Appellants‟ 
claims against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), asserting that 
venue was improper.  In the alternative, it moved to sever 
                                              
2
 Because the proposed injunction “commands that acts be 
done rather than not done,” it is a mandatory (or affirmative) 
injunction, not a negative injunction.  United States v. Apex 
Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2009); see also 11A 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2942 & n.37 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2011).  We retain the 
“negative” label because Appellants used it in their arguments 
to the District Court.  See infra section III.A. 
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those claims and transfer them to the District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, where the Birdmans and the 
Hirsches live.  The V. I. District Court granted the United 
States‟ alternative motion, transferring this part of the case to 
the Florida venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).  Before 
the Court entered its transfer order, Appellants moved it to 
certify an interlocutory appeal of that order to our Court 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
3
  They maintained that, under 
48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), jurisdiction (and thus venue) is proper 
only in the V. I. District Court.  The District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida stayed the case but re-transferred 
it to the V. I. District Court for the limited purpose of ruling 
on Appellants‟ motion to certify an interlocutory appeal.  The 
V. I. District Court then denied that motion.  Appellants, 
however, petitioned us for a writ of mandamus to compel the 
V. I. District Court to accept jurisdiction and venue.  That 
petition is before us as case    11-1462. 
 We have consolidated case 10-4189 with case          
11-1462, so all counts of Appellants‟ complaint are involved 
in this case.  But the issues are distinct.  We must decide, 
first, whether Appellants have stated a claim against the 
Virgin Islands, and second, what the proper venue is for 
Appellants‟ claims against the United States.  The latter 
question requires that we determine which courts have 
jurisdiction over Virgin Islands tax matters under 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1612(a). 
                                              
3
 As an order to transfer venue is not a final order, Appellants 
could not appeal as of right at this stage.  See In re Federal-
Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 378 (3d Cir. 2002) (“It is a 
well-established rule in this circuit (and generally) that 
„orders transferring venue are not immediately appealable.‟” 
(citation omitted)). 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The V. I. District Court had jurisdiction over 
Appellants‟ claim against the Virgin Islands under 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1612(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
1294(3).  Our review of the District Court‟s order granting the 
Virgin Islands‟ motion to dismiss is plenary.  McGovern v. 
City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  “We accept 
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw 
all reasonable inferences in [Appellants‟] favor.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must 
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). 
 We have jurisdiction over Appellants‟ mandamus 
petition under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.  That Act 
“gives appellate courts the power to issue a writ of mandamus 
„in exceptional cases where the traditional bases for 
jurisdiction do not apply.‟”  United States v. Higdon, 638 
F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Pasquariello, 16 
F.3d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1994)).   
III. Discussion 
 A. Claim Against the Virgin Islands 
 Appellants have asked the District Court to “compel 
the [Virgin Islands] and the VIBIR to issue a determination of 
the source of income for tax year 2006 as to Barclay and 
Kingsbridge.”  Compl. ¶ 61.  In support of this request, they 
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cite delays by the United States IRS in its challenge to their 
source of income for 2006 and other tax years.  Id.  
 The Virgin Islands moved the District Court to dismiss 
this count of the complaint for failure to state a claim.  In 
response to its motion, Appellants stated that they “relie[d] 
upon [that] Court‟s equitable powers to issue a negative 
injunction against the VIBIR for a determination of source of 
income pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 861-865.”  Chief Judge 
Gomez of the District Court at oral argument attempted to 
clarify Appellants‟ position.  He asked Appellants‟ counsel 
four times to state their cause of action.  J.A. at 303-05.  Each 
time, counsel responded that it was a “negative injunction.”  
When Chief Judge Gomez reminded counsel that an 
injunction is a remedy, not a cause of action, and that 
plaintiffs must have a cause of action to seek a remedy, 
counsel nonetheless responded: “Injunctive relief is a remedy.  
And under the law where it‟s at it‟s also a cause of action.”  
Id. at 305. 
 The District Court granted the Virgin Islands‟ motion 
to dismiss on the basis that Appellants had not satisfied the 
administrative requisites for a redetermination of their Virgin 
Islands tax liability.  It held in the alternative that any claim 
Appellants might have against the Virgin Islands was not 
ripe. 
 On appeal, Appellants urge that the V. I. District Court 
misconstrued the nature of their claim.  “[A]t no point did the 
Appellants attempt to litigate their respective income tax 
liabilities. . . .  The Appellants‟ complaint . . . stated in no 
uncertain terms that they were seeking a negative injunction.”  
Appellants Br. at 40.  They based no part of their appeal on 
the cause of action that the District Court ascribed to them.  
Yet Appellants now recognize that they must have a cause of 
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action to merit an injunction.  They proffer two on appeal: 
breach of contract and quasi-contract. 
 Appellants did not present these contract-based causes 
of action to the District Court.  Nowhere in their complaint or 
trial memoranda on this issue does the word “contract” 
appear, nor did they mention it in responding to Chief Judge 
Gomez‟s repeated questioning.  Those sources likewise do 
not suggest how the Virgin Islands might be in breach (as the 
operative paragraph of the complaint lists grievances only 
against the IRS), or how it might have been unjustly enriched 
(as Appellants paid the IRS, not the Virgin Islands, for the 
year in question).  If Appellants intended to make a contract 
claim, their pleadings do not “„give the defendant[s] fair 
notice of what the . . . claim is.‟”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  
Rather, “the pleading must contain something more by way of 
a claim for relief than . . . a statement of facts that merely 
creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally 
cognizable right of action.”  5 Charles Alan Wright et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 
2011). 
 “It is axiomatic that „arguments asserted for the first 
time on appeal are deemed to be waived and consequently are 
not susceptible to review in this Court absent exceptional 
circumstances.‟”  Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 
416 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Petersen, 622 
F.3d 196, 202 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010)).  The only causes of action 
that Appellants present for our review were not argued before 
the District Court.  Thus, they have waived any ground on 
which they might state a claim against the Virgin Islands.
4
 
                                              
4
 Appellants insist that “special circumstances” exist here that 
justify a departure from our well-settled rule.  However, they 
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 We also agree with the District Court that any claim 
Appellants might have against the Virgin Islands is not ripe to 
decide.  “[F]ederal courts are only empowered to decide cases 
and controversies” as our Article III jurisprudence defines 
them.  Felmeister v. Office of Att’y Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535 
(3d Cir. 1988).  Ripeness is among the requirements for a 
case or controversy to exist.  Id.  To determine whether a 
dispute is ripe, we must evaluate “the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision” and “the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration.”  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 Ripeness questions often arise when an agency has 
announced a decision to take a certain action, but that action 
remains tentative at the time of suit.  The seminal cases of 
Abbott Laboratories, cited above, and Toilet Goods Ass’n v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967), presented such facts.  A 
dispute generally is not ripe if the agency‟s “action „reflect[s] 
the tentative nature of [its] conclusion,‟ in which the [the 
agency] „expressly reserve[s] the possibility that [its] opinion 
. . . might change.‟”  Natural Res. Def. Council v. FAA, 292 
F.3d 875, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting N.Y. Stock Exch., 
Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).  For 
example, we held that a proposal to audit a hospital was not 
fit for decision, and thus not ripe, because “„[a]n 
investigation, even one conducted with an eye to 
enforcement, is quintessentially non-final as a form of agency 
action.‟”  Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 
F.3d 57, 69 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. 
v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 781 (9th Cir. 2000)).  This is 
                                                                                                     
do so on the basis of evidence outside the record, which we 
decline to consider.  See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a). 
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so because “the possibility that no enforcement action may be 
taken is real for several reasons, not least of which is that the 
[agency] may change [its] mind on one or more issues along 
the way.”  Id.   
 In our case, Appellants‟ claim is not ripe because the 
Virgin Islands has taken no action whose legality we can 
resolve.  The 2006 Virgin Islands tax returns of the Birdmans 
and the Hirsches indicate that they owe certain taxes.  The 
Virgin Islands has sent those taxpayers automated notices 
reflecting their own assertion that the taxes are due.  
However, it has made no formal determination of the amounts 
that are in fact owed; indeed, that determination is the relief 
that Appellants seek.  Much less has it begun any 
enforcement action.  At oral argument, counsel for the Virgin 
Islands indicated that the VIBIR has declined to take action 
pending the outcome of this and other lawsuits.  Oral Arg. Tr. 
23, 28.  Hence, the record presents us with a real possibility 
that the Virgin Islands will never seek to collect the disputed 
taxes.
5
 
 The causes of action that Appellants have pressed 
against the Virgin Islands in our Court are waived, and in any 
                                              
5
 Our law in two related contexts bolsters our conclusion that 
Appellants‟ claim is not ripe.  Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq., courts generally cannot 
compel an agency to enforce laws that Congress has charged 
it with enforcing.  See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 
(1985) (“[A]n agency‟s decision not to take enforcement 
action should be presumed immune from judicial review 
. . . .”).  And, under the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, courts 
generally cannot enjoin the collection of disputed taxes.  See 
I.R.C. § 7421(a). 
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event their claim is not ripe in the unique context of this case.  
We therefore affirm the District Court‟s dismissal of 
Appellants‟ claim against the Virgin Islands. 
B. Mandamus Petition Concerning Jurisdiction 
over Virgin Islands Tax Matters 
 We also must determine the appropriate forum for 
Appellants‟ claims against the United States.  To repeat, the 
District Court held that those claims “fall within the category 
of claims” defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), which governs 
certain claims against the United States.  Appellants do not 
challenge that conclusion.  The proper venue for § 1346(a) 
claims is, with exceptions not relevant, “in the judicial district 
where the plaintiff resides.”  Id. § 1402(a).  The District Court 
therefore transferred these claims to the District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, where the Birdmans and the 
Hirsches live.  See id. § 1406(a) (permitting district courts to 
transfer cases to the proper venue).  It denied Appellants‟ 
motion to certify an interlocutory appeal of this venue transfer 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
 Appellants petition us for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the V. I. District Court to decide these claims.  Under 
48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), they maintain, no other trial court has 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
 “The writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy that a court 
should grant only in extraordinary circumstances in response 
to an act „amounting to a judicial usurpation of power.‟”  
Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 
1996) (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)).  
For the writ to issue, the petitioner must have no other 
adequate means to attain the relief sought, and the right to the 
writ must be clear and indisputable.  United States v. Higdon, 
638 F.3d at 245 (citing Cheney v. United States Dist. Court 
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for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004)).  “Even when these 
prerequisites are met, however, the issuance of a writ is 
„largely discretionary.‟”  Id. (quoting Hahnemann Univ. 
Hosp., 74 F.3d at 461). 
 We have established that “a writ of mandamus may 
issue to compel a district court to vacate an order transferring 
a case to another district.”  In re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 
385 (3d Cir. 2001) (issuing writ and citing three prior cases in 
which we issued the writ for that purpose).  Thus, 
“„[m]andamus is . . . the appropriate mechanism for 
reviewing an allegedly improper transfer order.‟”  Id. 
(quoting Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., 5 F.3d 
28, 30 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 Appellants‟ petition for a mandamus writ requires that 
we construe the terms of the Revised Organic Act of the 
Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.  It “is the Virgin 
Islands‟ equivalent of a constitution, and as such, it is the 
body of law that defines the jurisdictional boundaries of the 
Virgin Islands courts.”  Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 
1032 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  In particular, it 
defines the jurisdiction of the V. I. District Court, which 
Congress established pursuant to Article IV, § 3 of the United 
States Constitution.  See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 631 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
 Prior to 1984, the Revised Organic Act provided 
considerable overlap between the jurisdictions of the District 
Court and the Territorial Court (now the Superior Court) of 
the Virgin Islands.  “„[W]hen Congress acted to establish the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, it established it as a court 
of original and general jurisdiction.‟”  Edwards v. HOVENSA, 
LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Carty v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 1055 (3d Cir. 1982)).  
“Under this jurisdictional framework, the District Court of the 
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Virgin Islands heard the majority of cases brought in the 
Virgin Islands, whether those cases were brought under 
federal law or local law, civil law or criminal law.”  
Callwood, 230 F.3d at 630.  Hence, we resolved numerous 
disputes about the overlap in jurisdiction between the District 
Court and the Territorial Court.  See, e.g., Excavation Constr., 
Inc. v. Quinn, 673 F.2d 78, 80-82 (3d Cir. 1982); Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc. v. Duly Authorized Gov’t of V.I., 459 
F.2d 387, 390-91 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 In 1984, Congress amended the Revised Organic Act 
and refashioned the jurisdiction of the V. I. District Court.  
Pub. L. No. 98-454, 98 Stat. 1732.  “By virtue of these 
amendments, the District Court now possesses the jurisdiction 
of a[n Article III] „District Court of the United States,‟” 
though it remains an Article IV Court.  Parrott v. Gov’t of 
V.I., 230 F.3d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 2000).  The District Court 
continued to have jurisdiction concurrent with the Territorial 
Court.  However, the Virgin Islands legislature could now 
divest the District Court of jurisdiction over certain local 
actions, see Estate of Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Court 
of V.I., 923 F.2d 258, 263-64 (3d Cir. 1991), and did so in 
1990, Brow, 994 F.2d at 1034.  In effect, the relationship 
between the District Court and the Superior (formerly 
Territorial) Court, both of which are Article IV courts, now 
somewhat resembles the relationship between Article III 
federal district courts and state courts.  See Edwards, 497 
F.3d at 359; Parrott, 230 F.3d at 621. 
 Congress‟s 1984 amendments included the 
jurisdictional language at issue in our case, which has not 
been amended since. 
The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall 
have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the 
United States, including, but not limited to, the 
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diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 
1332 of Title 28, and that of a bankruptcy court 
of the United States.  The District Court of the 
Virgin Islands shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
over all criminal and civil proceedings in the 
Virgin Islands with respect to the income tax 
laws applicable to the Virgin Islands, regardless 
of the degree of the offense or of the amount 
involved . . . . 
48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (emphasis added).  The parties agree that 
this is a “proceeding[] . . . with respect to the income tax laws 
applicable to the Virgin Islands.”  Id.  Appellants thus reason 
that the V. I. District Court has “exclusive jurisdiction” over 
this case as against all other courts.  In particular, they assert, 
the District Court for the Southern District of Florida lacks 
jurisdiction.  The United States, which opposes the 
mandamus petition, counters that the “exclusive jurisdiction” 
language operates only against Virgin Islands local courts.
6
  
Thus, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
would have jurisdiction to resolve these claims. 
 Our inquiry into the meaning of a statute begins with 
its plain language.  See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 
U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).  The grant of “exclusive 
jurisdiction” here applies to “all criminal and civil 
proceedings in the Virgin Islands with respect to the income 
tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands.”  48 U.S.C. 
§ 1612(a) (emphasis added).  A suit relating to Virgin Islands 
income tax pending outside of the Virgin Islands would not 
be a “proceeding[] in the Virgin Islands,” and “exclusive 
                                              
6
 “Local courts” include the Superior Court and the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands.  See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 2. 
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jurisdiction” would not apply.7  In other words, the phrase “in 
the Virgin Islands” provides a geographic limitation on the 
grant of exclusive jurisdiction, but the V. I. District Court‟s 
jurisdiction is “exclusive” only against other courts “in the 
Virgin Islands.”  See Thorstenn v. Barnard, 842 F.2d 1393, 
1396 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc) (“[The V. I. District Court] was 
created by an act of Congress and exercises exclusive federal 
jurisdiction in that Territory under the Revised Organic Act, 
48 U.S.C. § 1612.” (emphasis added)). 
 The presumption against superfluities reinforces this 
reading of the statutory language.  “[W]hen interpreting a 
statute, courts should endeavor to give meaning to every word 
which Congress used and therefore should avoid an 
interpretation which renders an element of the language 
superfluous.”  Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Appellants suggest no use for the phrase “in 
the Virgin Islands” beyond its use as a geographic qualifier, 
and we can conceive of none.  As the District Court 
recognized, Appellants‟ construction of § 1612(a) would 
                                              
7
 Other statutes bestowing “exclusive jurisdiction” on a court 
lack such language.  For example, the United States Supreme 
Court has “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all 
controversies between two or more States.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a).  Without any limitation on that grant of exclusive 
jurisdiction, the Court held that jurisdiction was proper in no 
other court.  Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77-78 
(1992); see also Pentax Corp. v. Myhra, 72 F.3d 708, 711 
(9th Cir. 1995) (affirming that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction where the statute provided without geographic 
qualification that “the Court of International Trade shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction”).  
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contain no geographic qualifier and thus would render part of 
the statute superfluous. 
 Neighboring provisions of the Revised Organic Act 
also show that the District Court‟s “exclusive jurisdiction” 
over Virgin Islands tax matters is limited to proceedings vis-
à-vis local courts.  Sections 1611, 1612, and 1613 of Title 48 
each concern the jurisdiction of the V. I. District Court in this 
context.  In particular, “[t]he legislature of the Virgin Islands 
may vest in the [local] courts . . . jurisdiction over all causes 
in the Virgin Islands over which any court established by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction.” 48 U.S.C. § 1611(b).    
Correspondingly, without a grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” 
in § 1612(a), the Virgin Islands legislature could vest 
jurisdiction over Virgin Islands tax matters in local courts.  
Cf. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 
(1962) (“Concurrent jurisdiction has been a common 
phenomenon in our judicial history, and exclusive federal 
court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law has 
been the exception rather than the rule.”).  Moreover, local 
court jurisdiction appears to be disfavored insofar as the 
Virgin Islands tax code “mirrors” the United States federal 
tax code.  See Abramson Enters., Inc. v. Gov’t of V.I., 994 
F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 The legislative history of the 1984 amendments to the 
Revised Organic Act further bolsters our interpretation of 
§ 1612(a).  The Senate record reiterates that “the income tax 
laws applicable to the Virgin Islands are the provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code.”  130 Cong. Rec. 23,782, 23,789 
(daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984).  Thus, “uniformity of interpretation 
requires that questions involving the interpretation of those 
laws be litigated only in the Federal courts,” plural.  Id.  That 
Congress meant “Federal courts” as opposed to local courts is 
apparent in what follows: “This provision appears to be 
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necessary in view of the characterization of the income tax 
laws of the Virgin Islands as a local Territorial tax which is 
reviewable in the district court only by virtue of local 
legislation.”  Id. (citing Dudley v. Comm’r, 258 F.2d 182 (3d 
Cir. 1958)).  The Virgin Islands income tax is analogous to a 
federal tax; thus, the Virgin Islands local courts lack 
jurisdiction.
8
 
 For these reasons, we hold that the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands has “exclusive jurisdiction” over 
proceedings “with respect to the income tax laws applicable 
to the Virgin Islands” only as against local courts in the 
Virgin Islands.  48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  The contested language 
is a division of jurisdiction in favor of the federal courts, in 
contrast to local courts, with respect to Virgin Islands tax 
cases.  Because the clause “proceedings in the Virgin Islands” 
has this meaning when read in its full context, it permits the 
transfer of cases brought in the Virgin Islands to other federal 
courts. 
 Appellants do not dispute the conclusion that if the 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida has 
jurisdiction, then the general venue rule of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1402(a) applies.  See 48 U.S.C. § 1614(b) (“Where 
appropriate, the provisions of . . . Title 28 . . . shall apply to 
the [V.I.] district court . . . .”).  Under § 1402(a), the only 
                                              
8
 The same legislative history states that Congress patterned 
the tax provision of § 1612(a) after a similar provision in the 
Organic Act of Guam.  See 48 U.S.C. § 1421i(h)(1); Gov’t of 
Guam v. Superior Court of Guam, 998 F.2d 754, 755 (9th Cir. 
1993).  It appears that no court has determined whether 
district courts outside of Guam have jurisdiction over Guam 
tax disputes. 
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proper venue for this action is the Southern District of 
Florida.  The District Court‟s transfer of this dispute to that 
District thus was not “a judicial usurpation of power, or a 
clear abuse of discretion,” so mandamus should not issue.  
Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Accordingly, we deny Appellants‟ petition 
for a writ of mandamus. 
 It is possible that the multiple courts possessing 
jurisdiction over Virgin Islands tax law may reach conflicting 
conclusions.  The same possibility inheres in the current 
jurisdictional structure of federal tax law.  In that context, 
courts “temper the independence of the analysis in which 
[they] engage by according great weight to the decisions of 
the other circuits on the same question.”  Wash. Energy Co. v. 
United States, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  They do 
so because “the need for uniformity of decision applies with 
special force in tax matters.”  Id.  We presume that our sister 
courts will exercise the same restraint in addressing questions 
of Virgin Islands tax law. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Appellants stated no cause of action against the Virgin 
Islands in the District Court, so the causes of action they 
allege on appeal are waived.  In the alternative, any such 
claim is not ripe, as the Virgin Islands has taken no 
administrative action against Appellants regarding the tax 
year 2006, tentative or otherwise. 
 The District Court of the Virgin Islands has “exclusive 
jurisdiction” over V.I. tax cases only vis-à-vis V.I. local 
courts.  Thus, it may transfer those cases to other United 
States district courts, provided that the other requirements of 
jurisdiction and venue are satisfied. 
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 We therefore affirm the order of the District Court 
dismissing Appellants‟ claim against the Virgin Islands and 
transferring venue of Appellants‟ claims against the United 
States to the District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida.  We deny Appellants‟ petition for a writ of 
mandamus. 
